Table of contents
At a glance
How should shared accounts be assessed under GMP?
Relevant human actions on GMP data need to be attributable to an individual. A shared editing account alone does not provide that attribution. Distinguish individual application accounts, technical service accounts and read-only access. Evaluate compensating controls for legacy systems in their actual context. A paper logbook is not an automatic exemption. In the US context, FDA explicitly distinguishes read-only accounts from attributable editing and second-person review.
- Access authorization and personal accountability are two distinct issues.
- A technical service identity is not evidence of the verifying person.
- Legacy boundaries require a specific suitability assessment rather than a blanket exception.
1. Link actions and identity together
In the Human Medicinal Product GMP Scope, Annex 11 requires appropriate access controls and verifiable identity for relevant data entries, modifications, approvals, or deletions. The control must align with the actual action performed. A personalized access at a particular location provides limited value if the application only retains "Labor" as the user identifier.
Evaluate the entire chain: enrollment, session, application function, and generated record. A shared workstation is not automatically equivalent to a shared application account. What remains critical is whether the relevant person and action are reliably linked.
2. Distinguishing account types after use
The following internal matrix ensures that no form of a non-personal account is treated uniformly. It does not constitute a blanket approval of the described configurations. For each row, technical feasibility, process considerations, and validation requirements must be assessed.
The FDA Guidance distinguishes, in the context of drug CGMP, pure read-only access from activities requiring individual assignment. A secondary review is also considered a personal action. It remains beyond a simple read-only function even though the original dataset is not modified.
| Use | Main question | Appropriate inspection point |
|---|---|---|
| Personal data entry | Is the correct person identified in the record? | Register, session, and data set reference verification |
| Shared work account | Which control actually replaces the missing assignment? | Do not accept a simple username as attribution. |
| Read-only access | Are processing and formal review truly excluded? | Test effective rights instead of role name |
| Technical Service | Which process creates or modifies data? | Service, implementation, and triggering event are linked |
| Personal Second Review | Who performed the specific testing? | Determine separately the verifiable test procedure |
| Administrative Override | Who used the access, when, and for what purpose? | Release, usage, and relevant changes traceability |
3. Personal login alone is not always sufficient
A user can log in personally and leave a session open for the next person. Then the technical identifier will continue to appear unique, although the action would actually be attributed to someone else. This is a different detection gap than an explicitly shared account, but no less important for the evaluation.
PIC/S requires that for systems with access to critical data, a logout must occur after a pre-defined, relatively short period of inactivity, followed by normal re-authentication (9.5). The appropriate inactivity timeout period for your specific process and work station must be established. Additionally, evaluate the behavior during user switching to ensure that a new user does not inadvertently continue working under the identity of the previous user.
4. Example: Two individuals, four actions
Person A enters a value; Person B corrects it; Person A prepares a report; Person B performs the intended secondary review. There are four relevant human actions involving two individuals. A history with four entries under "Labor" shows four events, but no verifiable individual assignment.
The required assignment of all four actions therefore demands accurate allocation. Additionally, a report generated automatically by a service is considered separately. This fifth activity must not be erroneously interpreted as a personal, technical review conducted by Person B. This example represents a test case, not an actual product test.
| Activity | Actual Actor | Expected evidence | Failure scenario |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1: Record value | Person A | Identity of Person A with the dataset | Only Laboratory Collection Identifier |
| 2: Correct the value | Person B | Person B, change, timing and required reason | Open session by Person A is further utilized |
| 3: Request report | Person A | Person A and the specific requirement | Requirement without personal attribution |
| 4: Second inspection | Person B | Person B and the reviewed status | Reading account is issued as a personal inspection. |
| 5: Automated export | Service Export-01 | Service process and alignment with requirement | Duty identifier replaces professional judgment |
5. Outdated systems require a honest boundary
PIC/S addresses the scenario where, for an older system, personal authentication is technically unavailable and no suitable alternative exists. In such cases, additional controls must ensure actual traceability. This represents a limited, to be evaluated situation and does not constitute general authorization for shared access credentials.
A paper-based record can be part of a solution, but remains vulnerable when entries are made retrospectively or when multiple persons work simultaneously. Verify whether the timestamp, activity, and individual can be clearly and unambiguously linked. If the control measures are insufficient for the intended use, the gap must not be documented as resolved.
6. Technical accounts operated without false personal identity
A service account may, for example, perform a controlled data transfer. First, it is essential to determine which process is authorized, what data it modifies, and how its execution is documented and traceable. Not every automated step requires a fabricated human operator identity.
As soon as a personnel member makes a business decision, such a decision must remain appropriately linked to the initiating event. A shared integration user within the target system must not eliminate the required traceability to the triggering action. Clarify which information the interface captures and where the audit trail can be reliably reconstructed.
7. Control access and changes during operation
Define, on a case-by-case basis, how access is established, modified, and revoked. Upon role changes or employee departure, actual access rights must align with the current requirements. Additionally, verify that regular users possess unnecessary administrative privileges and have the potential to influence relevant records or their controls.
In small organisations, personnel roles may overlap. In such cases, clear separation of regular and administrative usage, along with traceable controls, is essential. A software vendor's certificate does not address how your specific user accounts are configured and used in daily operations.
8. Checklist for Evaluation of Shared Accesses
Start with critical activities, not with a list of all user names. The evidence should demonstrate which relevant action is attributable and where technical limitations exist. Unclear attribution is not merely a formality.
The following internal assistance document supports a targeted review. It does not require a general acceptance of a specific identity product and does not rely solely on identity derived from the product name.
- Named relevant inputs, modifications, approvals, and reviews.
- Personal, technical, and pure read accounts distinguished.
- Effective rights and not just role names verified.
- User transition and open sessions considered.
- Cross-system personnel or process linkage traceable.
- Evaluated legacy substitute controls based on specific cases.
- Administrative use and permission modifications are appropriately controlled.
Project experience and collaboration
Attribute individual actions on shared equipment
With the laboratory or Production, IT and Quality, we follow a complete shift handover or user change. Who only reads data, who confirms a test and who changes system settings? Shared read-only access raises different questions from an account used for documented processing. In small teams, separate accounts and controlled administrator actions may be practical. We test permissions and session behaviour at the device so each action remains attributable to the right person.
Frequently asked questions about Shared user accounts
Is a shared workstations prohibited?
Not automatically. It is essential whether relevant actions can be appropriately assigned to a specific individual. A shared workstation with appropriate personal application access should be evaluated differently from a shared processing account lacking reliable additional assignment mechanisms.
Can a pure read-only account be used jointly?
For general viewing purposes, the FDA considers shared read accounts acceptable, provided that neither data nor settings can be modified through such accounts (Question 5). In contrast, a secondary review or confirmation is a personal action and must be attributable to a specific individual. Therefore, assess the effective rights of the account, not merely its designation.
Sources: [3]
Does the personal Windows login replace the application user?
Are service accounts inherently unsuitable?
No. Automated processes often require technical identities. Relevant aspects include authorization, process linkage, and traceability of their actions. However, a service account does not replace the necessary professional technical assessment. Separate the justification for machine execution from human decision-making in documentation.
Is a paper batch record sufficient for an older device?
Must every old system be immediately replaced?
Why is an open personal meeting problematic?
Since the identifier no longer reliably reflects the individual responsible. The audit trail may appear technically complete yet incorrectly attribute actions. Verify user transitions and appropriate session rules within the actual workflow rather than relying exclusively on the login dialog.
Can an administrator routinely work with their administrator account?
Typically not. According to PIC/S PI 041-1, users with extended rights are generally not intended to perform regular operational tasks within the system (9.5). In small teams, a designated individual may also hold administrator privileges; for routine activities, they would instead use a separate, restricted account. Administrative tasks are documented and authorized within the quality system, thereby ensuring role separation even in situations where a second person is not available.
Is a traceable username already considered an electronic signature?
No. A recorded identity and an electronic signature are distinct functions. Whether a signature process is required and what requirements apply depends on the specific process and regulatory domain. An audit trail identifier alone does not answer this question.
Sources: [1]
How do we test a shared identifier in an interface?
Sources and review date
Source date: 7 October 2026. The technical examples relate to human medicinal product GMP. FDA and MHRA statements are incorporated within their respective areas of applicability. Tables and numerical examples are intended as internal reference tools.
- European Commission: EU GMP Annex 11, Computerised SystemsRevision January 2011; from 30.06.2011; Principle; §§1,4,5,7,9–13,17; §12.4 Identity, Date and Time; §10 controlled changes
- PIC/S: PI 041-1, Data Management and IntegrityPIC/S PI 041-1, 1 July 2021. See section 3.7 for status, sections 7.5–7.8 and 8.1–8.8, sections 9.1.5 and 9.3 and 9.5–9.10, section 12.1 and the glossary.
- FDA: Data Integrity and Compliance With Drug CGMP, Questions and AnswersFinal Guidance, December 2018; Section III Q1(b)–(d), Q2, Q4–6, Q7–10, Q12–13, and Q18
- MHRA: GxP Data Integrity Guidance and DefinitionsRevision 1, March 2018; Sections 6.1–6.11 Data/Metadata/Processing; Sections 6.12–6.17 Transactions, Audit Trail, Review, Access, and Retention
- European Commission: EU GMP Chapter 4, DocumentationJanuary 2011; in effect since 30.06.2011; Principle; §§4.1–4.9, in particular timely recording 4.8 and visible correction 4.9; §§4.10–4.12 Storage
Sources checked: .
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