Regulations and compliance · Practical guide

Part 11: responding to lost signature credentials

Losing a device used for electronic signatures raises questions beyond a password reset. Which signing function is affected? Can someone still use the device, and what happened during the period of possible misuse? A small business can prepare a procedure and assign responsibilities in advance. An ordinary login is not automatically an electronic signature, and the loss does not automatically invalidate earlier signatures.

Table of contents

At a glance

What should you do when Part 11 signature credentials are lost or compromised?

For signatures based on identification codes and passwords, § 11.300 requires procedures that include electronically deauthorising lost or potentially compromised credentials and controlling replacement. Handle attempted unauthorised use separately. Select measures appropriate to the signature technology. Assess earlier signatures and affected records on their merits. Loss of a credential does not automatically invalidate them all.

  • Loss reporting, deauthorization, and controlled reissue are distinct steps.
  • Investigate affected processes based on the potential period of misuse.
  • A backup medium must not obscure the historical assignment of prior signatures.

First identify the affected signature function

§11.300 applies to individuals who use electronic signatures based on identification codes in combination with passwords. Therefore, first verify whether the lost item is associated with such a signature and what function it serves. A general building access card, a login account, and a signature access credential may be linked together, but they need not share the same control boundary.

The requirements presume the applicability of Part 11. This includes specific mandatory electronic records and electronic submissions to the FDA. Neither the location of a customer nor the mere use of cloud-based services determines this issue alone. The process described herein serves as a standalone work instruction for an explicitly adopted Part 11 signature process.

Sources: [1]

What loss detection and misuse detection must do

§11.300(c) specifies procedures for electronic deauthorization of lost, stolen, missing, or potentially compromised tokens, cards, and other devices that carry or generate identification codes or passwords. Appropriate and rigorous controls are established for temporary and permanent replacements. Documented reporting of loss alone does not constitute effective deauthorization.

Paragraph (d) addresses transaction protection measures against unauthorized use and the detection, as well as immediate and urgent reporting of unauthorized usage attempts to the system security function and, if applicable, to management. Paragraph (e) covers initial and periodic checks of the relevant equipment. These inspections shall be specified within the specific technical setup; the text does not provide a universal time value for helpdesk service support.

Sources: [1]

Complete the loss process prior to the emergency event

Define who receives a report that triggers a technical action and whose responsibility it is to assess its effectiveness. The reporter must know how to contact the responsible party. For outsourced services, a clear and traceable handover process to the supplier is required. A generic supplier statement does not substitute for evidence that the specific signature mechanism used internally has actually been deactivated.

The following matrix serves as a working aid. Role designations and responsibilities are proposed project decisions and do not constitute a legally defined organizational structure.

Example: Loss and replacement matrix
StepTaskExample ResponsibilityEvidence / open question
Notification Record lost medium M-17 and last safe usage date Users and Service Desk Timing, account linkage, and uncertainties documented
Deauthorization Use of M-17 to be electronically excluded Authorized System Administrator Which technical step operates within which linked signature services?
Misuse evaluation Investigate unauthorized tests and potentially affected signatures Process responsibility for system security Findings, time period, and professional implications evaluated separately
Replacement Verify identity; assign M-18 for control check Authorised issuing point Issue documented, no taking over of foreign identity
Effectiveness Old means fail; new means work according to purpose Designated Inspector Appropriate tests and retained historical signature assignment

Sources: [1]

A lost medium with a verifiable time boundary

Example: An employee confirms the last secure usage at 09:10 hours. The loss is detected at 09:40 hours; electronic deauthorization is verified at 09:52 hours. The time interval between the last secure usage and deauthorization is 42 minutes. This is the investigation period for this example, not a derived limit from Part 11, and no evidence of misuse is established.

In the assumed system, three signature events have occurred within the timeframe. Two of these can be explained by the employee based on the actual work process; one remains initially unexplained. The investigation must not automatically conclude falsification from this. It must establish the origin, significance, and impact of the event. A justified decision is required for further use of the associated record.

Example: Failure scenario; no completed product testing performed
Assessment pointStarting pointExpected behavior / resultInterpretation
Old process after deauthorization M-17 is used after 09:52 Uhr. No successful signature with M-17; attempt appropriately addressed The technical effectiveness shall be verified against the actually installed service.
New edition M-18 is assigned to the same approved individual. Controlled, specification-compliant signature possible No reuse of identity for another person
Historical View Previous signature with M-17 is invoked Signer, timestamp, and intent remain traceable Replacement does not affect prior authorship.
Unspecified event One of three events remains open Investigation and decision regarding the affected record An event remains unexplained; no automatic liability assignment.
Recovered Medium M-17 is later identified No unauthorised reactivation Further use would constitute a controlled decision-making action.

Sources: [1]

Identity verification and new access methods to be integrated

§11.100 requires unique personal assignment of an electronic signature and verification of identity prior to assignment or authorization. §11.300 supplements requirements regarding identification codes and passwords. When establishing a replacement, specify which identity is carried forward and which compromised means loses its authorization. A technical account reassignment must not cause any other person to appear as the original signer.

Whether additional ongoing sessions, further signature services, or dependent access mechanisms are affected depends on your architecture. Assess the actual scope of the mitigation measure. A disabled token may be insufficient if another, already compromised pathway continues to enable signatures. Conversely, the loss of a token must not be assumed to compromise any connected application without proper investigation.

Sources: [1]

Evaluate previous records selectively

Separate the technical security incident from the professional assessment of affected records. Evaluate which events are temporally and technically relevant and determine the decisions that are based on them. Ambiguous time points must remain visible as uncertainty. A seemingly precise list is inappropriate when the underlying protocols do not reliably cover the time period.

Sections 11.50 and 11.70 relate to signature attributions and their linkage to the respective record. These relationships must be maintained even in the case of account freezing or replacement. If a subsequent professional review or signature is required, such a requirement must be clearly identifiable as a separate transaction. A retroactive assignment of authorship to the original creator would not constitute a proper correction.

Sources: [1]

QA, IT, and Service Desk Checklist

This standalone checklist combines organizational readiness with technical effectiveness. It can be integrated into existing safety and deviation procedures; Part 11 does not require a separate document with a specific title.

  • Affected signature type, medium, and associated services are specified.
  • The deauthorization pathway and authorized personnel are accessible.
  • Last safe usage, identification, and technical action are distinct.
  • Unauthorized experiments are treated in accordance with §11.300(d).
  • Identity verification and controlled replacement issuance are governed.
  • Old and new access methods were considered with appropriate expected occurrences.
  • Historical signatures and their record linkage are retained.
  • Unexplained processes have a technically justified further treatment.

Sources: [1]

Which preparation determines the effort

The greatest risk of effort is often unclear responsibility across multiple departments. Clearly define which parties are authorized to close tickets only and which have the actual authority to revoke signatures. Perform a selected loss scenario using appropriate test identities and pre-agreed expected criteria, without compromising productive signatures.

For a small number of users, a brief and precise procedural description may suffice if it accurately reflects the actual workflows. The presence of multiple identity providers, external signatories, and various fallback options increases the need for coordination. There is no reliable, general time or cost estimate derived from regulatory requirements. What is essential are documented authorizations and verifiable effectiveness.

Sources: [1]

Project experience and collaboration

Review credential revocation, replacement and any associated signing events

With signature and security owners, we simulate the loss of a credential. We test how to reach the team that blocks it, how identity is verified, how replacement is controlled and whether earlier signatures remain attributable. Evidence of use during the possible misuse period calls for targeted investigation. Loss alone does not invalidate all previous signatures. We prepare the process and supporting records. Nobody may take over another person's signing identity.

Frequently asked questions about Lost access credentials

Does §11.300 apply to every lost smartphone?

No. Clarify whether and how the device generates or holds identification codes or passwords for an electronic signature within the scope of Part 11. Additional security requirements may exist independently of this. The provision discussed here does not automatically classify every mobile phone as a regulated signature medium.

Sources: [1]

Is it sufficient to change the password?

This depends on the actual signature architecture. The action must effectively deauthorize the affected lost or compromised medium. Specifically assess remaining access pathways and associated services. A documented password change is not sufficient evidence of effectiveness if the previous medium continues to enable signatures thereafter.

Sources: [1]

What fixed reaction time does Part 11 specify?

§11.300(c) specifies loss control procedures but does not establish a general numerical helpdesk threshold. Section (d) requires immediate and urgent reporting for unauthorized usage attempts. Establish appropriate workflows and contact availability tailored to your context, rather than prescribing an arbitrary hourly value as a rule.

Sources: [1]

Are all previous signatures invalid following a loss?

Not automatically. Determine which events could be technically and temporally affected and what indications are available regarding their actual origin. Document the investigation and the decision in relevant records. The loss alone does not imply fraud or the un reliability of all prior signatures.

Sources: [1]

Can a substitute account operate under a different employee name?

The signature must unequivocally remain attributable to the correct individual; it must not be reassigned to another person. A replacement procedure must not blur this identity. Whether a new account or merely a new means is technically required depends on the architecture and must preserve the historical attribution.

Sources: [1]

Are two components required at each individual signature field?

Not applicable to every signature. For non-biometric signatures, § 11.200(a)(1) requires at least two distinct identification components. During a continuous time period with controlled system access, the first signature is executed using all components. Subsequent signatures require at least one component that is exclusively assigned to the authorized person and is executable solely by them. Outside of such a time period, each signature must include all components.

Sources: [1]

Can a recovered medium be immediately reused?

Uncontrolled reuse would compromise the controlled handling of loss events. Assess its condition, potential compromise, and current release and testing procedures. The specific decision must be justifiable; mere rediscovery does not prove that the medium remained secure during the loss period.

Sources: [1]

Must QA sign off on each technical lock-down procedure?

A universal QA signature for each lock-down action is not specified in §11.300. Technical authorizations, security escalation, and business decision responsibility should be appropriately defined. The responsible quality unit may be involved when impacts on regulated records are relevant, without thereby being required to perform every individual technical action personally.

Sources: [1]

What documentation and evidence are required for an outsourced digital signature solution?

You require sufficiently specific information regarding deauthorization, emergency issuance, and the handling of affected processes. Assess which functions and evidence the supplier actually provides and which steps remain with your organization. A general compliance statement does not confirm that the specific lost substance has been effectively deactivated.

Sources: [1]

Does §11.300 require a password change every 90 days?

No, the regulatory text does not contain this generic numerical value. Paragraph (b) requires periodic reviews, recalls, or updates of expenditures and cites password rotation as an example. Therefore, the specific implementation should not be justified by an invented universal 90-day rule.

Sources: [1]

Sources and review date

Source date: 7 October 2026. eCFR notice period until 5 October 2026; separate consideration of binding regulatory text and non-binding FDA Guidance. Examples and tables are internal work aids and do not represent completed product testing.

  1. 21 CFR Part 11 – Electronic Records; Electronic SignatureseCFR display until 05.10.2026; §§11.1–11.300.

Sources checked: .

Daniel Herrmann, Daniel Herrmann Consulting

Daniel Herrmann Consulting

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